




Haiti, a Country in Crisis with the Presence of MINUSTHA Operating Solo on Haitian Soil.

“Our deepest fear is not that we are inadequate. Our deepest fear is that we are powerful beyond measure. We ask ourselves who am I to be brilliant, gorgeous, talented and fabulous? Actually who are you not to be? We were born to make manifest the glory of God that is within us. And as we let our own light shine, we unconsciously give others permission to do the same”.

Marianne Williamson

“After the kidnapping of Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” everyone would agree that Haiti was under occupation. Every action taken on behalf of Haiti was dictated by the quintet operating in Haiti namely United States, France, Canada, the United Nations, and Brazil. For over two years, there have been failed attempts by the international community, witch-hunts of political opponents by the de-facto government, failure to improve the lives of ordinary citizens, and a high wave of criminal activity. It is expected that the International Community would be better at implementing their policies due to the fact that they have gained experience on the ground and are responsible for the chaotic situation created in Haiti via their failed policies and mismanagement. To make matters worse, the Prével/Alexis constitutional government is perhaps the last to make a decision when it comes to Haiti. Policies have been based on and dictated by the quintet. The flow chart below has been proposed by the Canadian organization called FOCAL. FOCAL’s vision is what we are seeing currently in the administration in Haiti and Internationally. This chart below, as well as the behavior of the current administration will help support our contention here:

Modified Structure of the United Nations Mandate in Haiti by FOCAL



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The number of political prisoners currently in the Haitian penal system is quite appalling. Although under article 147 of the constitution, President Préval is empowered to free prisoners as long as they are deemed political prisoners. To this day, however, he has not evoked that right in order to satisfy the base of his political power, and ultimately correct the wrong that has been permeating Haitian society for the past three years. This inaction proves that the Préval/Alexis government is under the dictates as stated and illustrated above.

The mere presence of the MINUSTHA on Haitian soil without being under the direct command of President Préval is a grave violation of article 143 of the Haitian Constitution, which made President Préval the head of the army. In addition, he should have been the head of the United Nations armed forces in Haiti. Alternatively, President Préval should have designated an army chief for the UN forces on Haitian soil in the same way that the UN chief Ban Ki Moon has designated his own representative in Haiti.

Mr. David Wimhurst's interpretation of the "Status of Force Agreement" vis-à-vis the Haitian constitution and laws has created a negative impact on the current situation. He believes that this agreement is above all Haitian laws and the Haitian constitution. In addition, Mr. Edmond Mulet, currently replaced by Hedi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of Mission (MINUSTHA), has made negative statements such as "*he considers Haiti to be stable, but lacking institutions worthy of confidence*" shows a complete disregard for the Haitian authorities. His constant criticism abroad of the Haitian government for being slow, lacking competency, viable programs etc; and of President Préval clearly show that the UN is leading the country, and further complicate the notion of a sovereign nation with regard to Haiti. This is a direct violation of the UN mandate.

It is not permissible from even a mere protocol standpoint for Mr. Mulet to be so critical of the constitutional government in Haiti and abroad, and still has the ability to walk freely in Haiti, unless Haiti is under a protectorate as we believe. The presence and actions of MINUSTHA in Haiti complicate the situation further due to their gross disregard of the Haitian debacle. Their behavior can explain why they choose the wrong course of action. Should Haiti become stable, their reason to be on Haitian soil is suddenly diminished. The more chaotic the situation has become in Haiti, the more likely it seems that there is a need for their presence, a gross miscalculation on their part. The Haitian people will one day wake up and demand accountability and respect for the rule of Haitian laws. Every time that MINUSTHA's contract is to be renewed, there is always a wave of kidnappings as in the case of Lovinsky Pierre Antoine, member of the Gardère family and others.

An even bigger problem is that MINUSTHA is conducting vetting in Haiti for the security forces without really having any reliable data. With a military force training the police and conducting operations in Haiti, nothing serious worth mentioning is going to be accomplished with this current force in Haiti. With this attitude and behavior of rendition, the UN demonstrates that they are very incompetent when it comes to Haiti.

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As of (April 30 2007), the number of MINUSTHA troops is: **7,036 blue helmets from 19 members country and are deployed in six geographical departments of Haiti:**

| UNIT | LOCATION | GENDER | | TOTAL STRENGTH |
|--------------------------|----------------|------------|----------|----------------|
| | | MALE | FEMALE | |
| ARGENTIN BATTALION | GONAIVES | 411 | 2 | 413 |
| | PORT DE PAIX | 25 | 0 | 25 |
| | PORT AU PRINCE | 14 | 1 | 15 |
| | TOTAL | 450 | 3 | 453 |
| ARGENTINA AVIATION | PORT AU PRINCE | 35 | 0 | 35 |
| | LES CAYES | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | CAP HAITIEN | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| | Total | 41 | 0 | 41 |
| ARGENTINA HOSPITAL | PORT AU PRINCE | 40 | 17 | 57 |
| BOLIVIAN COMPANY | PORT AU PRINCE | 207 | 8 | 217 |
| BRAZIL BATTALION | PORT AU PRINCE | 1,044 | 4 | 1,048 |
| BRAZIL ENGINEER COMPANY | PORT AU PRINCE | 150 | 0 | 150 |
| CHILEAN BATTALON | CAP HAITIEN | 193 | 5 | 198 |
| | PIGNON | 12 | 0 | 12 |
| | PLAISANCE | 15 | 0 | 15 |
| | PORT AU PRINCE | 130 | 0 | 130 |
| | TOTAL | 350 | 5 | 355 |
| CHILEAN AVIATION | PORT AU PRINCE | 52 | 1 | 53 |
| CHILE ENGINEER COMPANY | QUARTIER MORIN | 08 | 0 | 08 |
| | PORT AU PRINCE | 76 | 3 | 79 |
| | TOTAL | 84 | 3 | 87 |
| ECUADOR ENGINEER COMPANY | QUARTIER MORIN | 11 | 0 | 11 |
| | PORT AU PRINCE | 55 | 1 | 55 |
| | TOTAL | 66 | 1 | 66 |

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| | | | | |
|---|---------------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| GUATEMALA MP COMPANY | PORT AU PRINCE | 103 | 11 | 14 |
| JORDAN BATTALION | PORT AU PRINCE | 746 | 0 | 746 |
| | MIREBALAIS | 411 | 8 | 419 |
| | HINCHE | 156 | 0 | 156 |
| NEPAL BATTALION 1 | ST.MARC | 140 | 0 | 140 |
| | TERRIER ROUGE POSTE | 33 | 0 | 33 |
| | TOTAL | 740 | 8 | 748 |
| NEPAL BATTALION 2 | PORT AU PRINCE | 342 | 8 | 350 |
| PERUVIAN COMPANY | PORT AU PRINCE | 205 | 0 | 205 |
| PHILIPPINE COMPANY | PORT AU PRINCE | 144 | 11 | 155 |
| | LEOGANE | 262 | 0 | 262 |
| | KILLIK | 344 | 0 | 344 |
| | BRACHE | 109 | 0 | 109 |
| SRI LANKA BATTALION | JACMEL | 117 | 0 | 117 |
| | PETIT GOAVE | 118 | 0 | 118 |
| | TOTAL | 950 | 0 | 950 |
| | LES CAYES | 224 | 20 | 244 |
| | JEREMIE | 194 | 5 | 199 |
| URUGUAYAN BATTALION - PORT AU PRINCE | | 166 | 4 | 170 |
| 1 | PORT SALUT | 125 | 7 | 132 |
| | MIRAGOANE | 29 | 0 | 29 |
| | TOTAL | 731 | 38 | 769 |
| URUGUAYAN BATTALION - FORT LIBERTE | | 190 | 12 | 202 |
| 2 | PORT AU PRINCE | 18 | 0 | 06 |
| | OUANAMINTHE | 27 | 0 | 30 |
| | TERRE ROUGE | 110 | 0 | 119 |

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| | | | |
|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| TOTAL | 345 | 12 | 357 |
|--------------|------------|-----------|------------|

| | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| PARAGUAY | PORT AU PRINCE | 31 | 0 | 31 |
| FORCE HEADQUARTERS | PORT AU PRINCE | 105 | 2 | 102 |
| GRAND TOTAL | | 6,930 | 120 | 7050 |

Based on the chart presented above, the Nepalese troops are not shown as being in Cap-Haitian; however, their presence there is quite remarkable. With war engines all over the place and great numbers of troops there, one has to ask if the Nepalese are in Cap-Haitian conducting some kind of covert operation. Instead of working to reinforce the Haitian police in order for that force to assume the security of the country i.e. protecting the Haitian nation. The Nepalese troops are happy to bring new recruits from their country and get them trained on Haitian soil with money earmarked for operations in Haiti. The Nepalese are in a dilapidated police station destroyed by the Gneisses and have done nothing to repair it. They have paid nothing to the Haitian Government for the facilities used. This is gross misconduct on the part of the UN. If this kind of misconduct is not changed, we can say with certainty that their presence on Haitian soil is not necessary.



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A greater proof of misconduct on the part of the UN, vis a vis Haiti, stemmed from the fact that MINUSTHA is using schools for military training camps. Schools in almost anywhere in the world are considered sacred places and safe havens. This ought to be corrected and the UN ought to make an apology to the Haitian people for this gross misconduct given the fact that Haiti does not have enough schools to educate its citizens.

The Nepalese troops continue to celebrate their free ride in Haiti at the expense of the Haitian people. The voiceless of Haiti do not benefit from their government or the UN presence in Haiti.

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Let's speak dollars and cents. Currently the Haitian national budget based on the last available figures stood at 64 billion gourdes, converted into American dollars is worth approximately \$1,828,571.429 with an approximated population of 8.5 million people. A quick analysis of budgetary expense would quickly show that Haiti has a per capita expense of \$215.13 compared to MINUSTHA with an annual budget of \$537,664,300 and personnel at 8,802 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008. A whopping per capita expense of \$61,084.33. With this exorbitant amount of money being available to the occupying forces, it is in their vested interest to see continued chaos in Haiti in order to validate their presence.

In 2004 with UN resolution 1542, a military force through the United Nations was necessary in order to restore peace quickly. However, at this time when security issues have shifted to a new dimension, the presence of MINUSTHA as it is presently formed is obsolete and incapable of restoring order in Haiti. The subsequent resolutions approved by the UN were quite faulty and incapable of changing the downward spiral in Haiti, unless it is revised from its intended purpose from inception.

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The Haitian Priorities Project (HPP) believes that when communities are faced with illegal drugs or gang related activities, there are certain steps that need to be followed in order to start identifying the tasks at hand to reverse this negative trend.

In the classical analysis in identifying gang-related problems facing a community, there are many ways in which the dilemma can be attacked.

One can use a comprehensive problem solving model called (S.A.R.A.) which includes four stages of the problem identification, solving processes, and follow-up such as Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment, and can implement processes that go beyond this model in order to be flexible enough in dealing with problems not foreseen by this model. (Goldstein)

Scanning

Includes identifying problems using knowledge of the area, basic data gathered from residents of the targeted area, and using updated and available maps of the region

Analysis

Includes using information technology to dig deeper into problems, characteristics, and underlying causes. Gang-related crimes are new to Haiti.

Response

Includes designing a solution and working in concert with the community

Assessment

Includes looking back to see if the solutions worked and what lessons can be learned in order to better deal with this kind of behavior. Further designing a strategy to eliminate further recurrence

In scanning, MINUSTHA failed greatly. Edmond Mulet and his crew associated the violence in Haiti with a political party. The information available and gathered, however, demonstrated that the intellectual authors of the violence are none other than groups of highly organized cliques that move drugs and cause harm to the population. There is evidence that officials of the de-facto government have used armed thugs to terrorize the population. It seemed easier for the occupying force to march on Cite Soleil since it is a strategically viable business area with the only aim at dislodging the inhabitants and causing more harm to a defenseless population. They were not committed to resolving the insecurity issues paralyzing Haitian society and further created a need for their presence on Haitian soil.

In Analysis, most of the people kidnapped provided information that they were taken to lavish houses, provided food and comfort in houses located in prominent neighborhoods and to this day, no operations have been conducted in those areas in order to try to dislodge the perpetrators. It remains clear that MINUSTHA is not following the path where the information leads. This is an inherent problem in the service provided by the occupying force, thus resulting in inflicting more harm to the general population of Cite Soleil with no apparent result from their operation in the area. The collateral damage is tremendous with no proof of the so-called gang members being apprehended as a result of their ongoing operation in this particular area.

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The problem should never be addressed only in terms of criminal law, as we have seen with ongoing operations of MINUSTHA with heavy collateral damage and no concrete proof of eradicating those so-called gangs. The social conditions contributing to this dilemma are to be addressed with direct community involvement and law enforcement agencies. MINUSTHA, as a formation of groups of armies around the world, is not equipped to deal with the problems facing Haitian communities, to keep them in Haiti with the same composition is to inflict more injury upon the Haitian people already in dire need of assistance.

The conditions that turn Haiti into a safe haven for criminal activities are further reinforced by the presence of MINUSTHA in Haiti. Their army is in every part of Haiti, and their infractions are met with impunity. They can engage in criminal activity without repercussion, thereby earmarking Haiti as an unsafe territory for its inhabitants and a safe haven for criminals.

Where do we go from here?

HPP knows already what the Brahimi's recommendations are and the United Nations is in possession of such information. Namely that "the roots of conflict were complex; peacekeeping operations alone, could not deal with them. More attention must be paid to socio-economic conditions." Therefore, the UN mission cannot be successful in Haiti if the right approach and the right personnel are not used on the ground in Haiti.

The Haitian Priorities Project believes the following needs to be done in light of these deficiencies, and as part of remedies given the significance of this situation for the Haitian people.

- 1) The Haitian government should be free in carrying out its programs and mandates, putting the needs of the Haitian people first.**
- 2) Create programs, focusing on the harmful behaviors exhibited, the likely causes, and provide remedies that are sustainable in order to curb such behaviors
- 3) Have a multifaceted approach, such as community involvement and participation in intervention, etc.
- 4) Program aiming at creating political stability over the long haul, initiating a national reconciliation including all groups comprising the Haitian society, including the Lavalas Party with Aristide included.
- 5) Creating economic hubs in the most deprived communities, thereby giving everyone a reason to live, and reinforcing the needs for their cooperation. Provide health care facilities immediately in those affected regions.
- 6) Flexibility in shifting priorities as deemed necessary and involve the judiciary system apparatus etc.

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7) Haiti needs to focus its meager resources at building democratic institutions, basic infrastructure, and responding to its population's dire needs for social services. MINUSTAH's presence in Haiti is depriving the Haitian government of much needed funds to meet these demands. If MINUSTAH remains in Haiti, it must be a civil mission to assist the Haitian government at building roads, catastrophe preparedness, energy enhancement, communications, government technology and health related preparedness etc.

8) We demand reparation for all victims of MINUSTHA's operations. We urge the Haitian government and the United Nations to set up a long-term fund in order to provide care for the victims and their families by MINUSTHA's operation, including psychological treatment. Moreover, we ask that the UN troops be held accountable for their crimes and the perpetrators should be punished according to Haitian laws.

9) We demand that Minustha leave all occupied schools used as training camps, and that reparation is paid to the owners of those institutions and students victimized by their operations.

10) The Brazilians troops must be replaced in Port-Au-Prince in order to root out kidnapping in the financial center of Haiti

The Haitian Priorities Project (HPP) would like to propose some additional recommendations with regard to the composition of the United Nations troops in Haiti.

The current composition of the MINUSTHA forces since April 30, 2007 stood at:

8,838 total uniformed personnel, including 7,036 troops and 1,802 police, supported by 433 international civilian personnel, 718 local civilian staff, and 193 United Nations Volunteers.

- We have already established that the current force of the United Nations is ineffective and will remain so as long as nothing is done to reverse the downward spiral. The numbers should be reversed with 7,000 police officers, and 1,802 troops from Creole and French speaking countries, officers and troops who can operate in either language. We have Haitian police officers and troops around the world working for other countries in all these capacities. The United Nations needs to make Creole and French a requirement in formulating its request to the member countries. This new configuration for the MINUSTHA will fall in sync with what the national police are trying to accomplish long-term by increasing the number of police officers on the ground, giving more time to the police force for proper training of additional police officers etc.

Haiti has about 138 communes. With 7,000 new police officers from MINUSTHA, the Haitian police will be able to have an additional 44 police officers dispatched in each commune for a total of 6,072 police officers. The remaining 928 police officers will be assigned to training the current Haitian police force in all aspect of Law, i.e. Canon Law, Civil Rights, Criminal Law,

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Criminal Procedure, Family Law, Constitutional Law, Freedom of Speech Law, Intellectual law, International Law, Legal Theories, Law and economics, Wills and Estate, Customs, Crime and Investigations, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Air Force, drug enforcement, environmental Protections etc, as well as training new recruits in the above capacities.

The other 1,802 troops will be dispatched to border patrol, as well providing training to designated Haitians while the new police officers to assume these roles are in training. Haiti will need about 600 hundred troops for border patrol. These officers should be able to communicate in either Creole or French and speak Spanish as well. The remaining 1,202 troops can be dispatched in diverse capacities including training Haitians in road building, catastrophe preparedness, energy enhancements, Communications etc. This configuration will allow MINUSTHA to be more effective on the ground.

If these minimal changes are not undertaken, MINUSTHA should leave Haiti by October 2007. The \$538,000,000 earmarked for MINUSTHA's operation should be reallocated to funding for sorely needed projects in Haiti.

Notes to explain some of the assumptions made above:

\$1= 35gourdes

64,000,000,000 Gourdes/35gourdes= \$1,828,571,429

8.5 million Haitians estimated

Per Capita expense = Annual Government Budgetary Expense divided by the number of habitants in Haiti

\$1,828,571,429/8,500,000 People = \$215.13

Per Capita Expense for MINUSTHA = MINUSTHA Annual Expense divided by the number of Personnel in Haiti

\$537,664,300/8,802 Personnel = \$61,084.33 of Per capita expenses

Additional sources:

United Nations

FOCAL

US Department of Justice

Brahimi Report

Goldstein, 1990

Jean-Bertrand Aristide

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